





Today the Superfund program is being run
about as well as it can be, but its performance
still is unsatisfactory:
- The pace of cleanup at contaminated sites
is too slow.
* Too much money is going into the pock-
ets of lawyers and consultants and not enough
into actual cleanup work on-site.
- Billions of dollars are being spent on
"cleanups" that produce only tiny benefits in
risk reduction in comparison with other avail-
able environmental investment opportunities.
For all these reasons, our national Super-
fund policy threatens to become a major deba-
cle, one ° that could discredit environmental
protection programs in the United States for
years to come. The problem is not that the En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) has failed
to do its job properly. After an admittedly rocky
start, by and large EPA is now faithfully exe-
cuting congressional mandates. After years of
disruption, the Superfund program is finally
working the way Congress intended-and
therein lies the problem.
The fundamental source of problems with
Superfund is not the way EPA is doing its job;
it is the nature of the nearly impossible job that
EPA has been given to do. As Bob Hahn, an en-
vironmental economist with the American En-
terprise Institute, wrote recently: "Superfund is
frequently criticized because of what are per-
ceived to be 'implementation' problems, [but]
the problems are really structural in nature."
What follows is a summary of EPA's recent
accomplishments in implementing the Super-
fund program, then reasons to question our cur-
rent policies in Superfund and other toxic
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cleanup programs are examined. Two basic
structural problems underlie the current Su-
perfund approach to cleaning up hazardous
waste sites: complexity and muddled objec-
tives. The final section discusses what can be
done to improve the situation.
In 1989, William Reilly took over as EPA
administrator committed to making the Super-
fund program work. Reilly's first step was to
appoint a task force of experienced agency of-
ficials to conduct a thorough review of the
administration of the Superfund program. Out
of this "90-Day Management Study" grew a
number of improvements, including EPA's "en-
forcement first policy." Rather than allow
lengthy negotiations with "potentially respon-
sible parties" (PRPs) to delay cleanups, EPA
now limits the period for negotiations. If agree-
ment cannot be reached, EPA will order one or
more of the PRPs to perform the cleanup or it
will do the cleanup itself.
Reilly also decided to turn administration
of the Superfund program over to EPA career
professionals rather than political appointees
from outside government. Reilly recommended
that the White House appoint one of the EPA's
top career managers, Don Clay, to take charge
of EPA's waste programs, including Superfund.
Under Reilly's new policies and Clay's ex-
perienced management, the Superfund program
has been setting new records by every measure
of performance. Settlements are up, case refer-
rals are up and, most important, actual on-site
cleanup work is way up. Since the end of fiscal
year 1988 (September 30, 1988), the number
of Superfund sites at which construction has
begun is up 215 percent (288 versus 134). The
number of sites at which remedial construction
has been completed is also up an impressive
146 percent (63 versus 43). (Completion of
construction is a better measure than deletion
of sites from the National Priority List (NPL),
because sites remain on the NPL for five years
after completion of work for reassessment of the
cleanup's effectiveness.) [Editor's Note: EPA has
changed its policy since this article was sub-
mitted. See 56 Fed. Reg. 66,601 (Dec. 24,
1991).]
However impressive these improvements
in administration of the Superfund program may
be, they are dwarfed by the daunting task that
lies ahead. There are presently 1,188 sites on
the NPL for priority cleanup. This number may
grow to almost 2,000 by the year 2000, with
more to come. In addition, an estimated 12,000
sites that do not qualify for the NPL may also
require some remediation. Total costs for Su-
perfund cleanups are estimated to range from
$25 billion to over $120 billion and Superfund
is just one of several government programs to
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clean up toxic waste sites. Other government
programs include: RCRA Corrective Action; the
Leaking Underground Storage Tank program;
federal facilities cleanups; uranium mill tailings
and abandoned mine lands cleanup programs;
not to mention asbestos, radon and other state
programs! When the entire national toxic waste
cleanup effort is considered, costs may mush-
room to $300 billion to $700 billion, accord-
ing to the independent Office of Technology
Assessment. (To put this enormous sum into
perspective, it is approximately equal to a tenth
of the annual gross national product of the en-
tire U.S. economy. Of course, these cleanup
costs would not be incurred in a single year,
but they still represent a major investment of
our country's limited resources.)
These enormous investments of our limited
resources might be worth making if the Amer-
ican people were getting their money's worth
in terms of reducing risks to health and the en-
vironment. They are not. Too large a share of
the huge amounts of money that we as a society
are pouring into Superfund and other toxic
cleanup programs is being wasted. No one
knows exactly what percentage of Superfund
spending is wasted, but we do know that too
much money is going into the pockets of law-
yers and consultants in unnecessary transaction
costs. In addition, many of the so-called "clean-
ups" will not work or, at best, will produce
very little real benefit at high cost. Estimates of
the total waste in Superfund in different studies
range from one-third to two-thirds of the total
amount currently being spent. Whichever per-
centage is correct, it is much too much. There
is undoubtedly some fraud and mismanagement
in any program as large as Superfund. However,
most of the waste is not caused by mendacity
or bureaucratic ineptitude but by two basic
problems that are built into the structure of the
Superfund program: undue complexity and
muddled objectives.
Problem 1: Complexity and High
Transaction Costs
The single most damning statistic about the
Superfund program is that it takes, on average,
ten years to clean up each site, but only about
three years is actual on-site construction work!
As the chart on page 13 shows, a total of twenty-
eight calendar quarters (not months), or seven
full years, is spent on a complex, legalistic and
bureaucratic process of extended study and as-
sessment of the site; review, negotiation, and
compilation of the legal record; and design of
the remedy. This is 70 percent of the total time
spent and a substantial, although lesser, share
of the cost.
The rules that govern this process of ex-
tended study and debate about what is to be
done at a Superfund site are stunning in their
complexity. The master rule that governs this
process, the National Contingency Plan (NCP),
is over 200 pages in length. It is supplemented
by countless EPA internal memos, guidance
documents, precedents, policies, internal prac-
tices and other forms of arcane lore that are
memorialized in roughly 12,000 "OSWER Di-
rectives" from EPA headquarters to its field
offices.
James Landis, the father of American ad-
ministrative law, once wrote that developing
simple "effective routines" is the key to good
administration. Unfortunately, however, for all
its volume and complexity, our enormous and
unwieldy body of law and administrative prac-
tice under Superfund fails to provide clear guid-
ance that can be administered efficiently and
predictably. Rather, the NCP lists multiple fac-
tors that must be weighed and balanced in each
individual case. Thus, each Superfund site is
viewed as essentially unique, with a remedy to
be custom-designed ad hoc through an exten-
sive process of analysis conducted in an adver-
sary setting.
This already complex process is made even
more difficult, time-consuming and expensive
by the necessity to involve scores (sometimes
hundreds) of PRPs directly or indirectly in every
decision. Former Assistant Attorney General
Richard Stewart once said that Superfund's ap-
proach to implementation is like declaring
everybody in town jointly liable for the con-
struction of a new town hall and then having a
mammoth lawsuit to design the building and to
allocate cost shares among all the residents.
To be sure, some portion of the time is well
spent in characterizing the site and designing a
remedy. In addition, some form of open, par-
ticipatory legal process is needed to allow ap-
propriate opportunities for affected parties and
the public to participate in making decisions.
But it is unlikely that seven years of complex
legal and administrative proceedings at each Su-
perfund site are really necessary to satisfy the
public's desire to participate, particularly be-
cause public hearings normally consume only
a few weeks of the total time involved.
There are understandable, historical rea-
sons why this complex, time-consuming and ex-
pensive set of Superfund procedures was
adopted. Much of the complexity is required to
implement the extraordinarily detailed and pre-
scriptive statutory provisions passed in the wake

















perience has shown, however, that these insti-
tutional arrangements are grossly "mismatched"
to the substantive policies they are intehded to
serve. Superfund's unique approach to' design-
ing a site cleanup is comprehensive study and
analysis in an adversary setting under bureau-
cratic supervision among multiple parties as a
prelude to negotiation and litigation. It is little
wonder that it takes seven years and at least $4
million in transaction costs at each site to con-
duct the necessary studies and design remedies
before the final cleanup can begin. (It is im-
portant to be clear, however, that EPA does not
wait for this seven-year bureaucratic process to
run its course before taking action to abate sit-
uations that pose imminent risks to health or
the environment. EPA is about to perform its
two thousandth "removal action" to remove
leaking drums or otherwise stabilize the situa-
tion at a Superfund site.)
Problem 2: Muddled and
Inconsistent Goals
Superfund's complexity and high transac-
tion costs are not an accident, nor do they result
(at least to any significant degree) from bureau-
cratic ineptitude or the desire of the legal
profession to feather its own nest. On the con-
trary, complexity and the high transaction costs
brought in its wake are an inevitable conse-
quence of a program with muddled, inconsis-
tent objectives.
As a nation we have been unable to decide
whether the goal of the Superfund program is:
- to clean up hazardous waste sites quickly
and efficiently so that they do not pose a sig-
nificant risk to health and the environment;
- to punish retroactively those who in the
past dumped toxic chemicals;
- to create economic incentives to deter
others in the future from releasing chemicals
into the environment;
* to reassure communities that their health
will be protected;
- to protect resources such as groundwater
for future use;
" to restore waste sites to pristine condi-
tion; or
" to enforce state and local decisions on
the appropriate level of cleanup.
Each of these policies-and many others-un-
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